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IV 
Nature of the Case 
Woodrow John Grant appeals the summary dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
The underlying facts of Grant's case have been previously outlined by the 
Idaho Supreme Court: 
In 2006, Woodrow John Grant pleaded guilty to aggravated 
battery; he successfully completed a period of retained jurisdiction 
and was placed on probation. In 2009, Grant was charged with 
possession of methamphetamine, domestic battery, aggravated 
assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Grant's appointed 
counsel moved to withdraw, stating that Grant had reneged on an 
agreed-upon plea bargain and that communications between then 
had broken down. The district court denied the motion. Later, 
Grant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and 
domestic battery, and admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation. The district court considered a letter and live testimony 
from the victim of Grant's domestic battery, in which the victim 
expressed her opinions on Grant's crime, character, and the 
sentence that would be proper for him. Thereafter, the district court 
sentenced Grant to five years fixed and five years indeterminate for 
domestic battery, to be served concurrently with a sentence of two 
years fixed and three years indeterminate for possession of 
methamphetamine. The district court also revoked Grant's 
probation and executed his preciously suspended sentence of four 
years fixed and six years indeterminate. The two new sentences 
were to be served consecutively to the reinstated 2006 sentence. 
Therefore, Grant was sentenced to a total of nine years fixed and 
eleven years indeterminate - far less than the thirty-two year 
maximum combined sentence for his three crimes. Grant 
requested leniency in three I C.R. 35 motions, which the district 
court denied. 
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State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, _, 297 P.3d 244, 245 (2013). Grant's 
judgments of conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. kl at _, 297 
P.3d at 251. 
Grant filed a pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction relief asserting 
twelve separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, that there was new 
evidence not previously presented, his guilty plea was induced, his guilty plea 
was involuntary because of mental incompetence, and his sentence was 
excessive. (R., pp.1-8.) Grant also filed a motion and affidavit in support for the 
appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.9-12.) The district court filed a 
notice of intent to dismiss Grant's petition for post-conviction relief, wherein it 
denied Grant's motion for the appointment of counsel because it found his claims 
were frivolous and failed to allege facts raising the possibility of a valid claim. 
(R., pp.23-49.) Grant filed a response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss, 
making the same arguments he asserted in his petition, with additional factual 
assertions, but failing to support his claims with any additional documents or 
affidavits. (R., pp.51-60.) At the same time, Grant filed a motion to amend his 
petition to include "underlying criminal records including, but not limited to, the 
county jail's records during defendant's stay there, the psych-evaluation, and the 
past and current medical records including mental health files." (R., p.50.) The 
court thereafter entered an order dismissing Grant's petition for post-conviction 
relief finding Grant's claims were without merit. (R., pp.86-107.) 
Grant timely appealed. (R., pp.117-121.) 
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ISSUES 
Grant states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred when it declined to appoint 
counsel in Mr. Grant's post-conviction action, even though he had 
made the necessary showing to merit appointment of counsel. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed 
Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief without properly 
considering the undisputed factual allegations he made in his 
verified petition and affidavit in support of that petition. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as follows: 





Grant Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Request For The Appointment Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Grant challenges the summary dismissal of his successive post-conviction 
petition and the denial of his request for counsel, contending the claims in his 
petition, considered either alone or in combination with his response to the 
district court's notice of intent to dismiss, raised genuine issues of material fact 
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing or, at a minimum, raised the possibility of a 
valid claim entitling him to the appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-27. Grant's arguments fail. Application of the law to the 
facts supports the district court's determination that Grant's pleadings failed to 
establish even the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim. Grant has therefore 
failed to show error in either the denial of his request for counselor the dismissal 
of his petition for post-conviction relief.1 
1 A post-conviction claim is properly dismissed if the petitioner fails to present 
evidence sufficient to show a material issue of fact on which relief can be 
granted. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522-23, 164 P.3d 798, 802-03 
(2007). Because this is a higher burden than demonstrating the possibility of a 
valid claim necessitating the appointment of counsel, Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 
22,24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009), Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 345, 223 
P.3d 281, 287 (2009), the remainder of this section of the Respondent's brief will 
focus on the "possibility of a valid claim" standard on the assumption that if Grant 
did not show entitlement to counsel the dismissal of his claims is proper, but that 
if he did show entitlement to counsel then dismissal without the opportunity of 
counsel to appear was error. 
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Standard Of Review 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or a request for 
appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 
682, 683, 214 3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). The court's discretion is not 
unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist 
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
654,152 P.3d 12,15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793,102 P.3d at 1112 
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the 
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing 
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. 
App.2009). 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
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expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P .3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for 
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set 
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001) (quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 
102 P. 3d at 1111). 
C. Grant Has Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To The Appointment 
Of Post-Conviction Counsel 
Grant asserts on appeal that the district court erred by denying his motion 
for appointment of counsel because he "made the necessary showing to require 
appointment of counsel as he alleged facts supporting some of the elements of 
his claims for relief." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Grant also argues the court violated 
his constitutional right to due process by failing to appoint post-conviction 
counsel because "the post-conviction action was [his] first opportunity to present 
these issues, particularly his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) Grant's arguments are unfounded. 
1. Grant Does Not Have A Constitutional Right To The Appointment 
Of Counsel In A Post-Conviction Proceeding 
Idaho law does not grant a post-conviction petitioner an absolute right to 
counsel. Rather, counsel may be denied for frivolous claims. I.C. § 19-4904; 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. Grant asserts on 
appeal that the district court erred by applying Idaho law in denying the 
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appointment of post-conviction counsel because he had a due process right to be 
represented by counsel "since the post-conviction action was Mr. Grant's first 
opportunity to present these issues, particularly his claims of ineffective 
assistance of counseL" (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Although he concedes "[t]he 
question of whether there is such a due process right has yet to be decided by 
the United States Supreme Court," Grant urges this Court to find !Idaho law 
regarding the appointment of counsel unconstitutional because he has an 
absolute constitutional right to post-conviction counsel. (See generally, 
Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) Grant relies on the United States Supreme Court 
case Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), for his contention that there 
should be a due process right to counsel in state post-conviction cases although 
he recognizes the Court "did not completely resolve that question." (See 
generally, Appellant's brief, pp.7-13.) Grant's reliance on Martinez is misplaced 
and his request for remand on this basis should be rejected. 
At issue in Martinez was "whether a federal habeas court may excuse a 
procedural default of an ineffective-assistance of counsel claim when the claim 
was not properly presented in state court due to an attorney's errors in an initial-
review collateral proceeding." 132 S.Ct. at 1313. In resolving this issue, the 
Court held, "Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural 
default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there 
was no counselor counsel in that proceeding was ineffective." Martinez, 132 
7 
S.Ct at 1320. Martinez clearly has no relevance here not only because this is 
not a federal habeas proceeding, but also because Martinez has no application in 
Idaho since, unlike the Arizona law at issue in Martinez, Idaho does not 
categorically bar defendants from raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
on direct appeal, see Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834, 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 
(2009). 
Grant has failed to establish the district court erred by applying Idaho law 
to his request for post-conviction counsel. 
2. The District Court Correctly Denied Grant's Request For Counsel 
Under Idaho Law 
Grant next asserts that even if this Court declines to find an absolute 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, the district court still erred in 
denying his request for the appointment of counsel under Idaho law because he 
"demonstrated the potential of a valid post-conviction claim." (Appellant's brief, 
p.13.) Grant has failed to show any basis for the reversal of the order denying 
his request for counsel because, as the district court correctly concluded, the 
allegations in Grant's petition for post-conviction failed to raise even the 
possibility of a valid claim. 
In analyzing Grant's request for the appointment of post-conviction 
counsel, the court cited the correct legal standard (see R., pp.24-27) before 
concluding Grant's allegations were frivolous and Grant failed to allege facts 
raising the possibility of a valid claim (R., p.27). The court specifically stated: 
Based on the following findings, the Court hereby DENIES 
the Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of counsel, as the 
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allegations made by the Petitioner are frivolous for the reasons 
stated herein. Furthermore, this Court finds the Petitioner did not 
allege facts raising even the possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, 
the appointment of counsel is not required. 
(R., p.27 (capitalization original).) Grant has failed to show he presented a viable 
claim of post-conviction relief, and has therefore failed to show error in the denial 
of his request for counsel. 
3. Grant Has Failed To Establish A Prima Facie Case That His 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise Him Of His Right To 
Remain Silent During The Psychosexual Evaluation 
In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
A post-conviction petitioner may demonstrate that his counsel was 
ineffective where counsel failed to inform him of his right to silence in relation to a 
psychosexual evaluation prepared for sentencing and the petitioner was 
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prejudiced. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564-565, 149 P.3d 833, 839-840 
(2006). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not 
make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). If the claims in 
the petition are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they 
could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel and 
further investigation, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed 
with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798,809 (2007); Hust v. State, 
147 Idaho 682,684,214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Grant asserts his counsel failed to "advise, attend, or protect [his] interests 
during the psych-evaluation." (R., p.3.) Further, Grant claims he "alleged facts 
[in his petition for post-conviction relief] which demonstrated a possibly valid 
claim that his attorney's performance was deficient" in failing to "advise him about 
his Estrada rights in regard to the psychological evaluation conducted as a part 
of the presentence investigation." (Appellant's brief, p.15 (citation omitted).) The 
facts alleged by Grant in his petition were simply that he was not made aware 
that he "was not obligated to provide information that would be used against 
him." (R., p.3.) The allegation that he was not advised of his rights, without 
more, does not show deficient performance or resulting prejudice. Although 
Grant asserted in his response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his 
petition for post-conviction relief that he was never informed that he was not 
required to participate in the psychological evaluation (R., p.54), Grant 
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"presented no admissible evidence to demonstrate his counsel failed to 
him properly regarding his rights prior to his participation in the psychological 
examination." (R.,p. 98.) Additionally, the district court found upon review 
Grant's guilty plea questionnaire that Grant understood his right to remain 
his right to refuse to provide incriminating information, and that his attorney "had 
advised him that he had 'a constitutional right not to submit to a court ordered 
psychosexual evaluation for purposes of sentencing.'" (R., p.98.) 
Finally, Grant does not even claim that being fully informed would have 
changed his choices in relation to his participation in the evaluation. The district 
court did not err in concluding that Grant's claims were disproved by the record 
and conclusory and therefore Grant failed to set forth the possibility of a valid 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the issue of failing to advise 
of his rights as they related to his submission to the psychological examination. 
4. Grant Has Not Shown The District Court Erred In Dismissing 
His Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To 
Protect Grant's Interests As Relating To His PSI 
Grant asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief that his counsel 
failed to "advise, attend, or protect [his] interests during the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation." (R., p.3.) Grant claims he was deprived of the opportunity to 
challenge, explain, or rebut the information in his PSI because his "attorney had 
failed to review the PSI with him or to assist him in challenging erroneously-
included or otherwise unreliable information contained therein." (Appellant's 
brief, p.21.) Grant takes the position on appeal that such failure was objectively 
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unreasonable and the allegation of such demonstrates the prejudice of counsel's 
performance. (Id.) 
Nowhere in Grant's petition for post-conviction relief, accompanying 
affidavit, or response to the court's notice does he assert what erroneous 
information was contained within his PSI or used against him at sentencing. 
Grant's unsupported statement that counsel deprived him of the right to 
challenge erroneous information alone is insufficient to establish deficient 
performance or resulting prejudice. Because this claim is frivolous, the district 
court did not err by denying counsel. 
5. Grant Has Not Made a Prima Facie Case For The Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failure To Provide Mitigating 
Evidence At Sentencing 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Grant alleged his counsel "failed to 
provide the sentencing court with mitigating evidence and evidence conflicting 
the victim's allegations despite such evidence being available[.]' (R., p.3.) In his 
accompanying affidavit, Grant asserted his victim had a "history of self-abuse" 
and had "threatened to blame [him] for injuries that were self-inflicted." (R., p.5.) 
Further, Grant stated the victim had "behavioral problems" and "brushes with the 
law" that had been "covered up." (ld.) Grant support these blanket statements 
with no admissible evidence. Grant claims he identified the evidence he believed 
trial counsel failed to offer in mitigation at his sentencing in his response to the 
district court's notice of intent to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief: 
Specifically, he alleged that there were two witnesses, one of 
whom would have contradicted the victim's version of events and 
who would have testified as to the overall inadequacies of the 
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investigation, and another who would have testified that the police 
had "'lost' testimony" or other evidence that should have been 
presented to the district court. 
(Appellant's brief, p.22 (citation omitted).) In his response to the district court's 
notice of intent to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief, Grant also 
included his attorney's failure to provide "mental health record from public and 
private institutions" as evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel for not 
providing adequate mitigation information the sentencing court. (R., p.S5.) 
To prevail on his claims that trial counsel was ineffective, a petitioner is 
required to present facts, supported by admissible evidence, to "overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 
(1984). An ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to present 
evidence cannot satisfy the deficient performance or resulting prejudice prongs 
without providing the substance of the potential testimony or other admissible 
evidence of facts counsel should have discovered and presented. Knutsen v. 
144 Idaho 433,443, 163 P.3d 222, 232 (Ct. App. 2007). To show deficient 
performance, a defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that counsel's 
performance was adequate by demonstrating that counsel's representation did 
not meet objective standards of competence." Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 124, 
952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). Indeed, it is 
well established that appellate courts "will not second guess counsel without 
evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 
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466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Larkin, 
102 Idaho 231, 234, 628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981); State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 
425,426, 546 P.2d 380, 381 (1976)). 
Here, Grant is asking this Court to second-guess his trial counsel's 
strategy at sentencing on the basis of lack of evidence. However, he has failed 
to meet his affirmative duty to show, through the presentation of evidence, that 
his trial counsel's alleged decision to not present certain witnesses or the results 
of mental health evaluations for sentencing was because of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, of any other objective shortcoming. 
That Grant currently believes that the better approach at sentencing would have 
been to argue that his victim's version of events was not true does not establish a 
non-frivolous claim of objective deficiency of trial counsel at sentencing. 
Additionally, Grant failed to assert any prejudice, only claiming on appeal 
that it is "strongly implied" in his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that 
"had the district court been presented with this evidence, Mr. Grant would have 
received a more lenient sentence." (R., p.22 (citation omitted).) Grant has failed 
to establish a potentially viable claim of deficient performance or resulting 
prejudice through his unsupported statements that trial counsel should have 
provided mitigating evidence at sentencing. 
6. Grant Has Not Established The Possibility Of A Valid Claim That 
His Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing to Move For A Change Of 
Venue Or To Disqualify The Presiding Judge 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Grant made the unsupported 
allegation that his trial counsel failed to move for a change of venue "even when 
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counsel was informed that the victim's mother was a secretary of the local 
chief." (R., p.2.) Additionally, Grant asserted the sitting trial judge should have 
been disqualified because of a potential bias. (ld.) These claims were not 
supported by any admissible evidence, only more unsupported factual claims, in 
Grant's response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his petition for 
post-conviction relief. (See R., p.52.) 
Additionally, Grant has failed to even allege any prejudice. He does not 
allege any basis upon which a motion for a change of venue or to disqualify the 
trial judge would have been granted. Grant is not entitled to a presumption of 
prejudice as he seems to assert on appeal. (See, Appellant's brief, p.25 ("Those 
allegations also imply the argument that the decision not to challenge venue 
cause prejudice to Mr. Grant through the loss of due process and a neutral 
magistrate.").) 
Grant failed to raise a potentially viable claim that a motion for change of 
venue or disqualification of the trial judge would have been granted. Because 
Grant failed to raise a non-frivolous claim that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to file a motion for change of venue or to disqualify the judge, the district court 
properly dismissed his claim without a hearing. 
7. Grant Failed To Establish A Potentially Viable Claim That His Guilty 
Plea Was Not Knowingly And Voluntarily Entered 
"Before a trial court accepts a plea of guilty in a felony case, the record 
must show that the plea has been made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, 
and the validity of a plea is to be determined by considering all the relevant 
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circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record." State v. 
Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 833, 839 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,297-98,787 P.2d 281, 283-84 (1990) (citation 
omitted). 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Grant asserted his guilty plea "was 
not knowingly/voluntarily entered as it was induced by promises not kept" as well 
as because Grant was "mentally incompetent due to being bi-polar." (R., p.2.) 
Grant claimed, without the support of admissible evidence, that his trial counsel 
"made false assurances of what the plea bargain would accomplish and what 
kind of sentence [he] could expect." (R., pA.) Grant also claimed his attorney 
"should have been cognizant of [his] bi-polar mood swings and recognized 
depression driven behaviors such as giving up and not appealing the sentence 
and conviction." (Id.) This claim is unsupported by any admissible evidence. 
Review of the record, which establishes that Grant entered the plea to avoid a 
possible conviction on greater charges and significantly longer incarceration, 
shows this claim to be without merit. 
Grant was originally charged with possession of methamphetamine, 
domestic battery, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm as 
well as facing a probation violation for an earlier conviction. He ultimately pled 
guilty to possession of a controlled substance and domestic battery, and 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation. "Grant was sentenced to a total 
of nine years fixed and eleven years indeterminate - far less than the thirty-two 
16 
maximum combined sentence for his three crimes." 
, 297 P.3d at 251. 
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Additionally, Grant claims he was unable to enter a knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent plea because of his "mental health issues." (R., pp.26-27.) Grant 
did not support his claim that he involuntarily pled guilty because of mental health 
Although he moved for the admission of "past and current medical 
including mental health files," such motion was made subsequent to the 
20 days provided in the notice of intent to dismiss his petition for post-conviction 
relief and only requested the court review such materials although no such 
documents were provided to the court. (R., p.50) Grant offered nothing more 
than his own conclusory statements and personal opinions as to his mental 
deficiencies and therefore failed to provide any admissible evidence that he was 
incompetent at the time he entered guilty plea. These bare assertions alone 
are insufficient to make a potentially viable case in light of the existing record. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Grant's petition for post-convicti 
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